Peer-reviewed articles:
- Costas-Pérez, Elena & Sánchez-Vidal, María & Salinas-Peña, Paula, 2019. "El sistema de becas y ayudas al estudio en el nivel universitario. Scholarships and study grants at the university level" La Cuestión Universitaria, 10, 54-77.
ABSTRACT: This paper offers a diagnosis of the system of scholarships and grants for university study in Spain between the years 2006-2016. Based on the analysis of the evolution of spending on scholarships and study grants, the level of government that finances them, their modality and their average amount, this work shows how the changes introduced in the regulations in 2013 modified the configuration of the aid system. Likewise, based on the analysis of microdata from the Living Conditions Survey, the level of progressivity of the current system is analyzed. Although the current system has a high level of progressivity and improvements compared to the previous system, there is still room for improvement. The differential treatment between regions, the increase in the amount of study aids for lower incomes and the reduction of academic requirements to ensure equal opportunities would be some of the reforms that would improve the current progressivity of the system.
- Costas-Pérez, Elena & Solé-Ollé, Albert & Sorribas-Navarro, Pilar, 2012. "Corruption scandals, voter information, and accountability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 469-484.
ABSTRACT: We study the effects of the availability of information about corruption scandals on electoral outcomes. The paper uses a novel and rich database with information on corruption scandals that affected Spanish local governments during the period 1996–2009. The database includes information about press coverage of each scandal and also about the intervention of the judiciary as published by the press. This allows us to analyze whether voters react to the amount of information (e.g., number of news) and to information regarding the seriousness of the case (e.g., judicial charges). We find that the incumbent's vote loss after a corruption scandal can rise to 14% when we consider cases in which the incumbent has been charged with corruption and press coverage has been extensive. However, we find no vote loss at all in cases dismissed or with reports to the courts which did not lead to further judicial intervention. The results suggest that information provided by the press modifies voters' beliefs regarding the prevalence of corrupt activities and helps them disentangle cases of founded vs. unfounded corruption.
Books and book chapters:
- Politikon, El muro invisible. Las dificultades de ser joven en España, Debate, (2017).
- Victor Lapuente (coord), La Corrupción En España. Un Paseo Por El Lado Oscuro De La Democracia Y El Gobierno, Alianza Ensayo, (2016).
- Les subvencions d'anivellament fiscal dels governs locals a Europa, (with N. Bosch and M. Espasa). Barcelona Deputation. Studies Collection, Barcelona (2008). [Las subvenciones de nivelación de los gobiernos locales en Europa, Fundación Democracia y Gobierno Local].
Working papers:
ABSTRACT: Corruption scandals may modify voter turnout, either by mobilizing citizens to go to the polls to punish or support the malfeasant politician or by demotivating individuals to vote as a consequence of disaffection with the democratic process. We study whether these effects depend on individual’s partisan leanings and/or the timing of corruption scandals. Our database includes information on Spanish local scandals from 1999 to 2007, and survey data on individuals’ turnout at the 2007 local elections. We use a matched database to identify the corruption-free pairs for our corruption affected municipalities’ sample. Our results show that while neither past nor recent corruption scandals have impact on turnout, repeated corruption cases boost abstentionism. We also find that independent voters - those with no attachment to any political party - are the only ones that withdraw from elections as a consequence of corruption. Core supporters do not modify their electoral participation after a scandal has broken out. Those who support the incumbent do not even recognise that their party is corrupt, while both independent voters and opposition core supporters report higher levels of corruption perceptions once a scandal is revealed.
- Costas-Pérez, Elena, 2015. "Political Corruption on Turnout: Mobilization or Disaffection?", Working Paper 2014/27, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB). (Job Market Paper; Submitted)
ABSTRACT: Corruption scandals may modify voter turnout, either by mobilizing citizens to go to the polls to punish or support the malfeasant politician or by demotivating individuals to vote as a consequence of disaffection with the democratic process. We study whether these effects depend on individual’s partisan leanings and/or the timing of corruption scandals. Our database includes information on Spanish local scandals from 1999 to 2007, and survey data on individuals’ turnout at the 2007 local elections. We use a matched database to identify the corruption-free pairs for our corruption affected municipalities’ sample. Our results show that while neither past nor recent corruption scandals have impact on turnout, repeated corruption cases boost abstentionism. We also find that independent voters - those with no attachment to any political party - are the only ones that withdraw from elections as a consequence of corruption. Core supporters do not modify their electoral participation after a scandal has broken out. Those who support the incumbent do not even recognise that their party is corrupt, while both independent voters and opposition core supporters report higher levels of corruption perceptions once a scandal is revealed.
Other publications and Policy Reports:
- Scholarships so nobody falls behind for Save the Children, 2018.
- Report on the evaluation of cultural activities and methodological proposal for Fundació Bancaria "la Caixa", 2018.
- Disinherited for Save the Children, 2017.
- Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2016 Progress Report, (with C.Cesca, J. Fouassier, A.Guerrero, V.Orru, N. Wanner and P. Chichereau). UNDP&OECD (2016).
- Evaluation of the Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism (ICIM), (with V. Elliott, K. Truong, W. Partridge, and M.V. Junho-Pena), Inter-American Development Bank Publications, (2013).
- Evaluation of Transnational Programs at the IDB, (with J.M. Puerta, L. Atuesta, M.E. Corrales and J. Sekkel), Inter-American Development Bank Publications, (2012).
- Country Program Evaluation: Peru (2007-2011), (with E. Cobas, R. Grassi and M. Soldano), Inter-American Development Bank Publications, (2013).
Work in progress:
- "Political Legacies of Corruption" (with Balcells, L.; De Vries, C.; Gallego, A.; and Solaz, H.)
- "Jobs lost, votes lost? Labour demand shocks and electoral accountability" (with A.I. Moragas and M. Sánchez-Vidal)
- "Satisfaction with government and corruption" (with Foucault, M.)